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Recently a creditor who breached the implied contract of good faith was found to have
risen to the level of equitable subordination.8 Specifically, in In re LightSquared, Inc.9, a
bankruptcy court equitably subordinated the claim of an entity that the founder, chairman of the
board, and controlling shareholder of a competitor of the debtor created in order to circumvent a
credit agreement’s restrictions on transferring the debt to certain parties.10 In particular, the court
determined that the entity acted in bad conduct by breaching the implied covenant of good faith
by (1) circumventing the credit agreement’s restrictions and (2) delaying the closing of the
entity’s purchases of debt from other creditors.11 Further, the court concluded that this conduct
resulted in damage to the other creditors.12 Accordingly, the court decided to equitably
subordinate the entity’s claim to the extent necessary to place the other creditors in the position
they would have been in if not for the wrongdoing.13
This case is significant for creditors because their claims may now be equitably
subordinated for conduct technically permitted under an agreement with the debtor. Creditor’s
need to take precautions to protect themselves in cases where their claims might be equitably
subordinated because in the court’s discretion their actions caused injury to other creditors. The
courts recent broad application of the equitable subordination doctrine may lead to fewer
dealings between creditors and debtors due to the fear of losing money.
This Article discusses the bankruptcy courts ability to equitable subordinate a creditor’s
claims. Part I of this Article discusses the requirements for equitable subordination. Part II
discusses the situations in which a bankruptcy court applies equitable subordination, focusing on
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breach of the implied covenant of good faith as a reason for equitable subordinating a creditor’s
claims. Part III discusses the implications of applying an equitable subordination remedy in a
bankruptcy proceeding.

I.

Equitable Subordination Generally

Section 510(c)(1)14 gives the court the power to subordinate claims, in whole or in part,
under principles of equity.15 In particular, the bankruptcy courts have the ability to invoke
equitable principles to achieve fairness and justice in the reorganization process.16 Under section
510(c), a bankruptcy court may adjust the priorities of creditor’s claims and interests and
subordinate all or part of a wrongdoing creditor’s claim to receive a just result that restores the
other affected creditors to the position they would have been in without the wrongdoing
creditor’s actions.17
In applying section 510(c)(1), many courts require a finding that the wrongdoing creditor
engaged in inequitable conduct that resulted in injury to other creditors or led to an unfair
advantage to the wrongdoing creditor.18 Although the Supreme Court has declined to decide
whether creditor misconduct is a prerequisite to the application of equitable subordination, such
misconduct is almost always present in the cases they decide to equitably subordinate a creditor’s
claim.19
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11 U.S.C.A. § 510
Id.
16
4-510 Collier on Bankruptcy P 510.01; In re Enron Corp., 333 B.R. 205, 221 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2005) (Gonzalez,
J.) (“In re Enron”) (“A bankruptcy court can subordinate any claim held by a creditor found to have engaged in
inequitable conduct to achieve a ‘just’ result for the debtor's estate”).
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Traditionally, the equitable subordination doctrine was only applied to insider claims.20
Recent case law, however, has expanded the scope of the doctrine to apply to non-insider claims
as well.21 For example, in In re 80 Nassau Associates22, the court equitably subordinated a noninsider’s claim in order to remedy the creditor’s unfair conduct that affected the claims of other
creditors.23 Importantly, the 80 Nassau Associates court did not distinguish between insiders and
non-insiders in its application of equitable subordination.24
Under the Mobile Steel test, the court will equitably subordinated a claim if, (1) the
claimant engaged in some type of inequitable conduct25; (2) the misconduct resulted in injury to
the creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant26; and (3) the equitable
subordination of the claim is consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.27 The third
prong is automatically met if the first two are satisfied.28
Under the first prong, the claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable
conduct.29 Since section 510(c) does not explicitly state what constitutes sufficient inequitable
conduct, many bankruptcy courts have developed case law that has determined the scope of the
principles of equitable subordination.30 For example, in In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.,31
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In re 80 Nassau Associates, 169 B.R. 832 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). Under section 101(31) of the Bankruptcy
Code, insiders of a debtor corporation include (1) a director of the debtor, (2) a officer of the debtor, (3) a person in
control of the debtor, (4) any partnership in which the debtor is a general partner, (5) any general partner of the
debtor, or (6) any relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.
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Id. at 840.
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Id. at 839.
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Id.
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Id.
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In re 80 Nassau Associates, 169 B.R. at 839.
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Id. (“The third prong of the Mobile Steel test acknowledges that equitable subordination cannot be used to alter
the statutory scheme imposed by bankruptcy law. Accordingly, while a bankruptcy court can apply the equitable
doctrine at its discretion, its power to subordinate an allowed claim is not boundless and courts cannot use equitable
principles to disregard unambiguous statutory language of the Bankruptcy Code.”)”
29
Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700.
30
11 U.S.C.A. § 510.
31
In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp., 277 B.R. 520 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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the court concluded that it would be inequitable for the creditor to benefit from his violation of
security law on behalf of other creditors that resulted in an increase of his account.32 The Adler
court further stated that the validity of the creditor’s claim does not affect the court’s decision as
to whether to equitably subordinate the claim.33 In addition, the court in 80 Nassau Associates
opined the requisite that inequitable conduct is not limited to fraud, but includes any conduct that
is brought about by one’s own unconscionable, unjust, unfair, or foul conduct.34 The court
determined that the creditors conduct of deceiving debtors into believing that paying certain real
estate taxes on their property would help restructure their mortgages was inequitable.35
Under the second prong, the misconduct must have injured the creditors of the debtor or
resulted in an unfair advantage on the wrongdoer.36 In particular the conduct must has caused the
other creditors to receive less money than they would otherwise because of the misconduct.37
This injury must have caused the general creditors to be less likely to collect their debts as a
result of the alleged inequitable conduct.38 The court has the discretion to determine the extent of
the injury to the creditor or the unfair advantage to the claimant.39 In exercising this discretion
the court will consider other factors, including administrative convenience and the delay of a
bankruptcy proceeding, historical considerations of equity, and the broad equitable principle that
creditors should not disadvantage one another by legal delays.40
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If the court determines the creditor has satisfied the Mobile Steel test, the court must then
decide what extent to equitably subordinate the claim.41 A claim should only be subordinated to
the extent necessary to offset the harm caused by the inequitable conduct.42 Accordingly,
equitable subordination is remedial, not a penal in nature and therefore should be used
sparingly.43 It is designed to undo or offset the affects of the creditor’s inequitable conduct that
produces injustice or unfairness.44
Furthermore, the court in Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron
Corp.)45 determined that any claim may be equitably subordinated if doing so is necessary to
effectuate the remedy set forth in section 510(c).46 The court held that although the creditor had
not engaged in unlawful conduct by transferring debt under the credit agreement, the claims of
the creditor should nevertheless be equitable subordinated.47 The court opined that the
transferring of debt was used solely to escape responsibility and therefore injured other creditors
by leaving them to hold the blame.48 The Enron court further stated that inequitable conduct is
considered anything that will allow fraud to prevail and will prevent substantial justice from
being done.49 The court held that the application of the Mobile Steel test ensures that the remedy
of equitable subordination is available, while making certain that its reach does not go too far as
to violate any provision of the Bankruptcy Code or make the remedy punitive instead of
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Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 700.
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Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.), 333 B.R. 205 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
46
Id. at 217-19.
47
In re Enron Corp., 333 B.R. at 237.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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remedial.50 One recent case that has further expanded the reach of equitable subordination is In
re LightSquared.51

II. In re LightSquared – Expanding Equitable Subordination

In LightSquared, the court held a creditor’s claims should be equitably subordinated
because the creditor had breached the implied covenant of good faith of a credit agreement by
acquiring restricted debt and caused harm to other claimants by delaying the closing of the sales
of restricted debt.52 In LightSquared, the debtor entered into a credit agreement that restricted
transferring the debt to certain disqualified companies and all natural persons.53 When a
competitor company inquired about purchasing the debt, it discovered that the agreement’s
schedules listed competitor as a disqualified company.54 Since the competitor could not purchase
the debt directly, its controlling shareholder formed an investment vehicle for the exclusive
purpose of buying the debt, thereby circumventing the credit agreement’s restrictions on
transferring the debt, in order to give the competitor effective control over the debtor’s
reorganization.55

50

Id. at 219.
In re LightSquared Inc., 511 B.R. 253 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
52
Id. 361.
53
Id. at 267- 68 (“The Credit Agreement restricts transfers of the LP Debt. Section 10.04(a) of the Credit Agreement
provides, in pertinent part:
[N]o Lender may assign or otherwise transfer any of its rights or obligations hereunder except (i) to an
Eligible Assignee in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Section 10.04, (ii) by way of
participation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (d) of this Section 10.04 or (iii) by way of
pledge or assignment of a security interest subject to the restrictions of paragraph (f) of this Section (and
any other attempted assignment or transfer by Borrower shall be null and void).”
54
Id. at 269 (“Disqualified Company” is defined in Section 1.01 as follows:
[A]ny operating company which is a direct competitor of the Borrower identified to the Administrative
Agent in writing prior to the Closing Date and set forth on Schedule 1.01(a), and thereafter, upon the
consent of the Administrative Agent ... such additional bona fide operating companies which are direct
competitors of the Borrower as may be identified to the Administrative Agent from time to time and
notified to the Lenders. A Disqualified Company will include any known subsidiary thereof.”).
55
Id.
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The investment vehicle was under capitalized, resulting in the controlling shareholder
funding multiple purchases by transferring money from his personal account.56 While the
controlling shareholder always had enough money to cover his purchases, he would delay
closing the multiple purchases because the vehicle had the right to vote the debt before the
transactions closed.57 The controlling shareholder submitted a bid to purchase the debtor that
would have resulted in the creditor being paid in full and an additional significant profit.58
Subsequently, after the investment vehicle blocked the debtors attempted to reorganizing, the
debtor filed for bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.59
Approximately a year after the debtor filed, one of the debtor’s major shareholders
commenced an adversary proceeding against, amongst others, the competitor, the investment
vehicle, and the controlling shareholder, alleging multiple causes of action arising out of the debt
purchases.60 Subsequently, the debtor intervened in the adversary proceeding and filed a
complaint asserting numerous causes of action against the defendants.61 In response to the
debtor’s complaint, the defendants each moved to dismiss the complaint.62 In addition, the
investment vehicle also moved to dismiss the major shareholder’s complaint.63 The bankruptcy
court then dismissed all of the claims asserted by a major shareholder, except its claim seeking to
disallow an investment vehicle’s claim under section 502(b).64 With respect to the debtor’s
claims, the court only dismissed the debtor’s equitable disallowance claim and its tortuous
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In re LightSquared Inc., 511 B.R. at 277.
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Id. at 263.
61
In re LightSquared Inc., 511 B.R. at 263.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY
11439
57

8

interference claim against the investment vehicle.65 The bankruptcy court then held a trial with
respect to the remaining causes of action.66
With respect to the equitable subordination claim the court applied the Mobile Steel test.67
Under the first prong, the bankruptcy court found that the investment vehicle engaged in
inequitable conduct by purchasing the debt thereby breaching the covenant of good faith and
delaying the closing of the transactions.68 The investment vehicles purchase of the debt violated
the purpose of the credit agreement’s restrictions to prevent competitors from acquiring the
debt.69 Along with the investment vehicle’s inequitable conduct in acquiring the debt, the
creditor engaged in inequitable conduct by effectively delaying hundreds of millions of dollars of
debt.70 The creditor engaged in such actions even though he was faced with repeated demands to
close and had the funds necessary to close readily available.71
Under the second prong, the investment vehicles delay in the closing the purchases of the
debt resulted in harm to other creditors because it was done for no specific purpose and
prevented other creditors from using the money as they desired.72 Therefore, the investment
vehicle’s inequitable conduct inflicted unquantified harm on the other creditors as a result of the
delay, uncertainty, and increased administrative costs to those creditors.73 The court determined
that the other creditors were harmed by the conduct, but did not determine the amount of the
harm.74 Therefore the court decided to equitable subordinated, but elected that the amount be

65

Id. at 264.
In re LightSquared Inc., 511 B.R. at 263.
67
Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 700.
68
In re LightSquared Inc., 511 B.R. at 341.
69
Id.
70
Id
71
Id.
72
Id. 360-61.
73
In re LightSquared Inc., 511 B.R. at 360-61.
74
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determined later.75 The issue however, was rendered moot because of the bankruptcy court’s
plan to sell the creditor’s assets.76 Therefore, not withstanding the court’s previous ruling, the
debt will not be equitably subordinated as previously decided.77
III. Implications of this Expanded Application of Equitable Subordination

Equitable subordination provides the court with a significant and powerful ability to
remedy the inequitable conduct of a creditor prior to or during the misconduct. In particular, the
remedy protects other creditors from being harmed by such conduct. The remedy of equitable
subordination is applied in cases where the creditor’s misconduct has produced an unfair
advantage for himself and has harmed other creditors. This is a remedial remedy that should be
applied very sparingly in bankruptcy courts. Moreover, it is remedial in nature and not punitive,
as such the harm of the injured creditors will only be remedied to the extent necessary to restore
the injured creditors to the position they would have been in if the conduct had not occurred. It is
only designed to protect creditor’s who have been harmed by inequitable behavior on the part of
another creditor.
While equitable subordination it is traditionally only applied in fraud, it is now applied to
many other types of conduct that courts find inequitable. As such creditors should be careful in
the actions they take in purchasing debt. LightSquared, for example, is important because it
demonstrated that competitors should be concerned about gaining a strategic advantage over the
75

Id.
Motion for Order Authorizing LightSquared to File Under Seal Portions of Exhibits Attached to LightSquared’s
Motion for Entry of Order, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 363, Authorizing LightSquared to (A) Enter Into
and Perform Under Letters Related to $1,515,000,000 Second Lien Exit Financing Arrangements, (B) Pay Fees and
Expenses in Connection Therewith, and (C) Provide Related Indemnities, In re LightSquared, 511 B.R. 253 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 12-12080 (SCC)).
77
Id. In applying each of the prongs from the Mobile Steel test, the court decided to equitably subordinate the
investment vehicle’s claim in an amount to be determined later. However, the bankruptcy court subsequently
confirmed a chapter 11 plan that would sell the debtor’s assets from the competitor and repay in full the investment
vehicle. As a result, Controlling shareholder will receive 1.5 billion dollars for his shares and control over the
company. Therefore, the investment vehicle’s claim notwithstanding the courts previous ruling will not be equitably
subordinated as previously held.
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debtor to acquire its debt. In particular, if you circumvent ownership restrictions in the credit
agreement, the creditor risks having all or part of its debt subordinated. Which in turn will impair
its apply to effectuate its desired results. Since equitable subordination can lead to drastic
outcomes, such as losing all or part of your claim, creditor’s need to be careful in the actions they
take in acquiring debt.
The court also demonstrates the subsequent actions that the creditor can take to buy his
way out. In LightSquared, the creditor was able to reach an agreement with the debtor to give up
ownership of his claims to avoid them from being equitably subordinated. Even if the court finds
it is inequitable conduct the debtor and the creditor can reach a consensual agreement that
resolves the equitable subordination claim in a way such that each party benefits.
LightSquared is also significant because it demonstrates the need to carefully draft a
credit agreement in such a way that minimizes the ability of third party to circumvent the
agreement’s restrictions on transferring the debt. For example, in LightSquared, the credit
agreement included the undefined term subsidiary in the definition of “Disqualified Company,”
which was not broad enough to include the investment entity under the definition a “Disqualified
Company” because the competitor did not own the investment entity. By failing to include the
defined term “Affiliate” in the definition of “Disqualified Company,” the credit agreement failed
to prohibit the transfer of debt to an entity under common control with a Disqualified Company.
Accordingly, had the credit agreement included Affiliate in the definition of Disqualified
Company, the investment entity would have qualified as a Disqualified Company because the
investment entity and the competitor were under the common control of the shareholder.
Additionally, a borrower should attempt to protect itself by including a provision in the credit
agreement that makes debt held by Disqualified Companies unenforceable, which would prevent
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strategic purchase of the debt. Lenders, however, may not be willing to agree to such a term that
could expose them to liability if they transfer the debt to a company that turns out to be
ineligible.
If creditors and debtors have to start taking precautions and affirmative steps in their
dealings, these dealings many begin to diminish. Bankruptcy courts need to be careful in
applying the remedy of equitable subordination so broadly. Although these courts are only trying
create fair dealings, their actions but may be eliminating deals altogether.
IV. Conclusion

Bankruptcy courts may equitably subordinate in cases where the creditor has engaged in
inequitable conduct that injuries the other creditors or provides an unfair advantage to the
offending creditor. The bankruptcy court inquires whether the claimant must have engaged in
some type of inequitable conduct that resulted in injury to the creditors or conferred an unfair
advantage on the claimant and was consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. If
court finds that all requirements are meet they will equitably subordinate the claim of the creditor
to the extent necessary to remedy the harm. Traditionally applied only in fraud cases, this
remedy is now applied in all cases that result in harm to other creditors or an unjust benefit to the
wrongdoing creditor. For example, been applied in breach of covenant of good faith. Among
other reasons, creditor’s need to take certain precautions when entering into agreements since the
remedy of equitable subordination is becoming more widely applied. Creditors need to make
sure that any action they take will not be considered bad faith or inequitable in the court’s view.
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